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AN UNCERTAIN RIGHT: THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AND THE ASSAULT
WEAPON LEGISLATION CONTROVERSY
Weapons change but man who uses them changes not at all.
Gen. George Smith Patton1
"[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms,"2 although
rarely debated by legal scholars,3 is often the focus of political and
legal controversy.4 In recent years, the United States has exper-
' Letter from Gen. George Smith Patton to Cadet George S. Patton IV (June 6, 1944)
(written one year before Gen. Patton's death).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IL The Second Amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia, be-
ing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed." Id. At the time of enactment, copies of the text were reproduced by
hand, and the capitalization and punctuation of the amendment are therefore not uniformly
documented. See David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the
Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 1 n.1 (1987).
Forty-three state constitutions guarantee a similar "right to [keep and) bear arms."
Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 59, 59 (1989). California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wis-
consin are the only states that do not in some form specifically guarantee the right to keep
and bear arms. Id. at 59 n.2. See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS,
STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989) (study and
comparison of federal and state rights to keep and bear arms); Robert Dowlut & Janet
Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
177 (1982) (analysis of states' constitutional guarantees of right to keep and bear arms).
' See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639-
40 (1989). "[Tlhe [S]econd [A]mendment is not taken seriously by most scholars." L.H.
LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 373, 375 (1989).
Indeed, one of the foremost treatises on constitutional law relegates its discussion of the
amendment to a footnote. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-2, at
299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) Only two articles, Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983), and Levinson,
supra, have appeared in "elite" law reviews, and only two "major" books, STEPHEN P. HAL-
BROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984),
and WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, THE SECOND AMENDMENT
AND ITS INTERPRETATION (1989), provide an in-depth and comprehensive study of the Second
Amendment. See Levinson, supra, at 639 n.13; see also William A. Walker, Book Review, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1409-14 (1990) (reviewing FREEDMAN, supra).
Although the Second Amendment is not the only academically-ignored section of the
Bill of Rights, the others are neglected for good reason. See Levinson, supra, at 640-41 &
n.25. For instance, the Third Amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers "in any
house, without the consent of the owner," is ignored by legal scholars because it has virtu-
ally no contemporary significance. Id.; see also infra note 28 (text of Third Amendment).
' See Charles M. Newman, The Clockwork Amendment, STATE B. NEWS, Feb. 1991, at
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ienced alarming increases in violent crime,5 and although much of
4; This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 19, 1989) (massacre in
California and drug-driven crime wave spark national debate on gun control); cf. George
Gallup, Jr., Report No. 300, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 38-39, reprinted in
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990 203 (Kathleen
Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (public opinion di-
vided on banning possession of handguns, with 55% opposed to ban); Mark Udulutch, Note,
The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control Pro-
posals, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 19 (1989) ("The public is polarized on the issue of gun
control.").
This topic is continuously the subject of articles and editorials in major newspapers
across the country. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 641. In fact, at the time of the writing of
this Note, over 90 articles and editorials concerning gun control have appeared in major
newspapers during 1991 alone. See, e.g., Carl Ingram, Lungren, Roberti OK Rewriting of '89
Gun Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at A3 (California's law banning military style assault
guns rewritten to ensure enforceability); Wayne King, A Lesson in Beating Gun Control to
the Draw, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 4, at 6 (New Jersey State House succumbed to
lobbyist pressure and proposed bill exempting sporting guns from assault rifle ban); A Gun
Law to Be Proud of, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at B4 (editorial condoning implementation of
ban on sale of military-style assault weapons). Furthermore, it is of major concern to the
National Rifle Association ("NRA") and other associations organized by gun enthusiasts.
See NRA BYLAWS, art. II, reprinted in FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 34. The NRA Bylaws
declare the following to be the organization's main purposes and objectives:
1. To protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, especially with
reference to the inalienable right of the individual American citizen guaranteed by
such Constitution to acquire, possess, transport, carry, transfer ownership of, and
enjoy the right to use arms, in order that the people may always be in a position
to exercise their legitimate individual rights of self-preservation and defense of
family, person, and property, as well as to serve effectively in the appropriate mili-
tia for the common defense of the Republic and the individual liberty of its
citizens;
2. To promote public safety, law and order, and the national defense;
3. To train members of law enforcement agencies, the armed forces, the militia,
and the people of good repute in marksmanship and in the safe handling and
efficient use of small arms;
4. To foster and promote the shooting sports, including the advancement of ama-
teur competitions in marksmanship at the local, state, regional, national, and in-
ternational levels;
5. To promote hunter safety, and to promote and defend hunting as a shooting
sport and as a viable and necessary method of fostering the propagation, growth,
conservation, and wise use of our renewable wildlife resources.
The Association may take all actions necessary and proper in the furtherance
of these purposes and objectives.
Id. Along with the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, the NRA is
the most powerful pro-gun faction in America. See Udulutch, supra, at 19 n.2. With an
operational budget of over $85,000,000, the NRA is considered to be one of the most power-
ful and influential lobbyist groups in the nation. See Vivienne Walt, NRA Weapon Against
Gun Ban Grows Bigger, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb. 24, 1991, at 13, 47.
1 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1990 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 7 (1991) [hereinafter CRIME
REPORTS]. Statistics indicate that in the United States, a violent crime is committed every
17 seconds. Id. From 1989 to 1990 alone, homicides increased nine percent, and both robber-
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the problem may be traced to poverty, unemployment, lack of edu-
cation, and the prevailing drug crisis,' many people perceive the
proliferation of guns on our streets as the most immediate cause of
this upsurge in violent crime.' Consequently, federal, state, and lo-
cal legislators have become embroiled in debates regarding the en-
actment of legislation to increase the regulation of firearm sales in
general and to ban the sales of the controversial "assault
weapons."8
The gun control debate of course centers on the Second
ies and aggravated assault increased over ten percent. Id. at 8, 20, 23.
6 See MARTIN R. HASKELL & LEWIS YABLONSKY, CRIMINOLOGY 345, 488-91, 497-99 (3d
ed. 1983); cf. RAYMOND J. MICHALOWSKI, ORDER, LAW, AND CRIME 66 (1985) (key to social
peace is creation of societies in which people have little reason or opportunity to behave
criminally). According to opinion polls, most Americans believe that drugs and unemploy-
ment are the key factors responsible for the upsurge in violent crime. See George Gallup,
Jr., Report No. 285, THE GALLUP REPORT, June 1989, at 25, reprinted in SOURCEBO0K, supra
note 4, at 174.
7 See HASKELL & YABLONSKY, supra note 6, at 204-05 (guns induce violent behavior);
Kates, supra note 3, at 204 (gun control often suggested as method to reduce crime);
Udulutch, supra note 4, at 23 (firearms "serve as the tools for social violence"). But see
Kates, supra note 3, at 205 n.3 (reliable study indicated no correlation between gun owner-
ship and crime) (citing NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WEAPONS, CRIME AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1-2 (1981)); Franklin E. Zimring, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REV. 954,
955 (1985) (no conclusive evidence of link between firearm availability and violent death
rate) (reviewing JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA (1983) and FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (Don B. Kates ed.,
1984)).
8 See Roger Johnson, The Danger of 'Assault Weapons' is a Modern-Day Myth, WASH-
INGTON TIMES, July 26, 1991, at F2 (ban on assault weapons not motivated by public safety
but by political considerations); see also Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Sec-
ond Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 5, 6-7 (1989) (Bush administration's Drug Czar stated that banning assault
weapons would create "'serious constitutional problems' "). See generally FIREPOWER: AS-
SAULT WEAPONS IN AMERICA (Cox Newspapers ed., 1989) [hereinafter FIREPOWER] (collection
of articles criticizing possession of assault weapons).
The sentiments expressed by New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins provide an excel-
lent illustration of political opposition to assault weapons:
This past January [1991], I proposed a total and absolute ban on these imple-
ments of death and destruction-to send a clear signal that our city will not toler-
ate the wanton violence caused by assault weapons.
Assault weapons-and feeding devices that fire many rounds at a time, spray-
ing bullets and claiming innocent lives-are clearly not designed for sport. As I
have said so many times, you don't go hunting for deer and ducks with an AK-47.
Assault weapons are designed for one foul purpose-to intimidate and to kill
other human beings.
In my view, the countless deaths and injuries clearly outweigh all arguments
to keep these weapons of war in our city.
Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks at Bill Signing 1-2 (Aug. 16, 1991) (available through
The City of New York, Office of the Mayor) [hereinafter Dinkins].
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Amendment,9 with those in opposition to gun control, including
the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), asserting that the amend-
ment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms and
gun control advocates claiming that the amendment protects only
the state's right to maintain organized military units.10 Although
proponents of both views raise compelling constitutional, political,
and sociological questions, gun control debates have, on the whole,
been influenced more by passion than by rational thought.1
This Note will examine the constitutional right to keep and
bear arms and the controversy surrounding assault weapon legisla-
tion. Part One explores the historical background of the right to
keep and bear arms from the common law to the enactment of the
Second Amendment. Part Two analyzes the two principal interpre-
tations of the amendment, discusses its application against the
states, reviews judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment,
and suggests that, because the debate is influenced more by politi-
cal ideology than by sound constitutional interpretation, both gun
control advocates and individual rights proponents have advanced
theories that conflict with their traditional interpretations of the
Constitution. Finally, Part Three focuses on recent assault weapon
legislation and examines the legal challenges to and the practical
considerations of this type of gun control.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. Colonial America
During this country's colonial period, gun ownership "was
See generally Kates, supra note 3 (study and analysis of gun control based on Second
Amendment). Additionally, gun control raises Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions. See
id. at 204-06 & nn.4-7; see also Udulutch, supra note 4, at 34-41 (analyzing constitutional
implications of Fourth and Fifth Amendments on gun control).
o See Udulutch, supra note 4, at 30-34; infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text; see
also Dowlut, supra note 2, at 68-71 (noting balance between both justifications in statutory
interpretation of Second Amendment); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 42-50 (analyz-
ing Supreme Court decisions on state's right interpretation of Second Amendment); Kates,
supra note 3, at 206, 244-52 (discussing Supreme Court's Second Amendment analysis). But
cf. Hardy, supra note 2, at 3 (neither state's right nor individual right school of thought is
correct).
" See Zimring, supra note 7, at 954 (pervasive ideology and lack of studies compound
problems in gun control debate). In fact, one of the co-authors of this Note attended the
New York City Council vote on the ban of assault weapons on July 30, 1991 and observed as
proponents and opponents of the local law, advocating irreconcilable positions, resorted to
name-calling.
[Vol. 66:179
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deemed a basis of character and citizenship."' 2 Many of the
Founding Fathers, including George Washington, Thomas Jeffer-
son, and James Madison, owned and collected firearms.'3 Indeed,
at least one commentator has observed that a certain religious
quality marked the relationship between a man and his weapon. 14
Just as much of our common law is traceable to the common
law of England, so too is the issue of gun ownership. 5 In 1689 the
22 See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 45.
13 See id. President Washington was an avid collector of guns; according to some esti-
mates, he owned "more than fifty firearms, including, rifles, shotguns, and pistols." Id.; see
also Kates, supra note 3, at 228 ("[Washington's] writings are full of laudatory references to
various firearms he owned or examined.").
Thomas Jefferson "was also strongly in favor of gun ownership." Id. at 229. In a letter
to his 15-year-old nephew, Jefferson wrote:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercises, I advise the
gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the Body, it gives boldness, enterprise
and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others of that
nature, are too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind. Let your
gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.
Id. (quoting THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., 1967)).
James Madison wrote that the colonists should never fear their government because of
"the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). During Virginia's constitutional convention, Patrick Henry put forth the proposition
that "[t]he great object is that every man be armed" and that "[e]veryone who is able may
have a gun." See Kates, supra note 3, at 229 (quoting 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENroNs 45 (2d ed. 1836)).
" See Kates, supra note 3, at 229 (quoting C. Asbury, The Right to Keep and Bear
Arms in America: The Origins and Application of the Second Amendment to the Constitu-
tion (1974) (unpublished doctoral thesis in history, University of Michigan)).
"I See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 7 (central thesis of gun control opponents is
that old common law of England supports fundamental, personal right to be armed); Levin-
son, supra note 3, at 647 (contemporary American historiography links development of
American political thought, including its constitutional aspects, to republican thought in
England); see also Dowlut, supra note 2, at 60 (discussing historical background and intent
of Framers of Constitution).
Those persons asserting that the right to keep and bear arms existed at common law
usually trace its history to Henry II's Assize of Arms of 1181. See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan,
supra note 8, at 8 (discussing decree and related subsequent events); HALBROOK, supra note
3, at 38-40 (same). The Assize of Arms reads as follows:
1. Let every holder of a knight's fee have a hauberk [(a tunic of chain mail)], a
helmet, a shield and a lance. And let every knight have as many hauberks, hel-
mets, shields and lances, as he has knight's fees in his demesne.
2. Also, let every free layman, who holds chattels of rent to the value of 16 marks,
have a hauberk, a helmet, a shield and a lance. Also, let every layman who holds
chattels worth 10 marks have an 'aubergel' [(a breastplate)] and a headpiece of
iron, and a lance.
3. Also, let all burgesses and the whole body of freemen have quilted doublets and
a headpiece of iron, and a lance.
4. Moreover, let each and every one of them swear that before the Feast of St.
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Protestant-dominated British Parliament, alarmed by King James
II's support for the growing Catholic movement in England, 6 en-
acted a bill of rights containing a provision that protected an indi-
vidual's right to keep and bear arms. 7 The Protestants perceived
this right as a fundamental principle of liberty" and as being es-
Hilary he will possess these arms and will bear allegiance to the lord king, Henry
namely the son of the Empress Maud, and that he will bear these arms in his
service according to his order and in allegiance to the lord king and his realm. And
let none of those who hold these arms sell them or pledge them or offer them, or
in any other way alienate them; neither let a lord in any way deprive his men of
them either by forfeiture of gift, or as a surety or in any other manner.
5. If anyone bearing these arms shall have died, let his arms remain for his heir.
Id. at 38. Similar provisions were set out in acts by Henry III and Edward I. Id. at 39-40.
As with the right to keep and bear arms, the regulation of weapons seemed to flow from
the English common law. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing arms limitations in
early English law); HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 40-43 (discussing gun control laws of abso-
lute monarchs); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 8 (possession of arms regulated since
early times).
I" See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 11-13. After ascending to the throne, James
II increased the size of the army, began replacing Protestant army officers with Catholics,
id. at 11-12, and sought to disarm the Protestants. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 43-48.
Fear of the strength of the Catholic movement in England caused the "Glorious Revolution"
in 1688, resulting in James II's abdicating the throne and fleeing the country. See id. at 43.
The aim of the Revolution was to abolish the standing army of James II, estimated at
53,000, see Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 12, and to restore to the Protestants the
right to keep and bear arms. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 43.
17 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 11-14; Newman, supra note 4, at 4; see also
HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 43-46. "These rights to petition and to keep and bear arms, the
only individual rights recognized in the English Bill of Rights, reappeared exactly a hundred
years later in a more absolute form as Articles I and II of the Americans Bill of Rights." Id.
at 46. The pertinent section of the English Bill of Rights relating to the Second Amendment
reads as follows:
Whereas the late King James II did endeavor to subvert and extirpate the Protes-
tant religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom by ... raising and keeping
a standing army within this kingdom without the consent of Parliament and quar-
tering soldiers contrary to law, by causing several good subjects being Protestants
to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed and employed
contrary to law.., and ... for the vindicating and asserting of ancient rights and
liberties . . . [we] declare ... that the raising or keeping a standing army within
the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against
the law; that the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense
suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 12 (quoting 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 42-43 (1971) (alterations in original)). But see id. at 14
(historical evidence does not suggest, however, that English Bill of Rights established indi-
vidual right to use arms for any lawful purpose).
1" See Newman, supra note 4, at 4 (1689 Bill of Rights codified precepts which were
already considered fundamental principles of liberty). See generally HALBROOK, supra note
3, at 47 (discussing common law of England). "'I cannot see, why arms should be denied to
any man who is not a slave, since they are the true badges of liberty ... .'" Id. (quoting
1992] AN UNCERTAIN RIGHT
sential to the preservation of their own lives.19
In colonial America, the tendency to adopt the basic precepts
of English law, together with the fear of attack by Indians and the
general uncertainty of the new world, resulted in the approval of
individual gun ownership. 20 Weapons possession was a natural by-
product of the times,21 and in some instances the entire adult male
citizenry was affirmatively required to possess arms.22
B. The Militia
The militia, well established in England, was employed in the
colonies to provide law enforcement and protection against at-
tack.23 The militia was comprised of every able-bodied adult male,
ANDREW FLETCHER, POLITICAL WORKs 35 (1749) (Robert Watson ed., 1798)). "Richard Henry
Lee opined that 'to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always
possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them...."' Dowlut,
supra note 2, at 65 (quoting LEERs FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124
(1978)).
"0 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 13 (commentators suggest that England's
Bill of Rights "assert[ed] the right of the Protestants to protect themselves from persecu-
tion by their Catholic enemies"); see also FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 44. "This right of self-
defense was apparently found in the law of nature and 'is not, nor can be, superseded by
any law of society.'" Id. (quoting MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 273-74 (London, 1776));
Kates, supra note 3, at 230 (Founders believed "self-defense [was] an inalienable natural
right").
10 See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 44. The Indians, themselves victims of invasions by
the English, French, Dutch, and Spanish, at times responded aggressively, and this threat to
the colonists, together with other conditions prevailing on the frontier, "required every citi-
zen to go armed for his own defense." Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the
Constitution, 54 HARv. L. REV. 181, 186 (1940).
21 See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 44.
22 See Kates, supra note 3, at 215 n.46. "In 1623, Virginia forbade its colonists to travel
unless they were 'well armed'." Id. In 1631, Virginia's colonists were bound to participate in
target practice on Sundays and had to bring their weapons to church. Id. Virginia gun own-
ership law was supplemented in 1658 with a requirement that all households have a func-
tioning firearm, and in 1673, the State provided indigent citizens with firearms and required
them to repay the government for the weapon at a reasonable price when they had the
means to do so. Id.
Georgia required that "'every male white person' carry a rifle or pistol every time he
attended church, and church officials were empowered to search each person no less than
fourteen times per year to insure compliance." FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 22 (quoting Act
for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry
Firearms to Places of Public Worship (1770), reprinted in 1775-1780 GEORGIA COLONIAL
LAws 471 (1932)).
In Massachusetts, the first session of the legislature required both free men and inden-
tured servants to own a weapon, and later, in 1644, imposed a fine upon any person who was
not armed. Kates, supra note 3, at 215 q.46.
2 See Kates, supra note 3, at 214-15.
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with each member expected to supply his own weapon and ammu-
nition and to be on call for drills and periodic duty.24
Influential Federalists, including George Washington, dissatis-
fied with the performance of the militia during the Revolutionary
War25 and believing that uniformity in arms, discipline, and train-
ing were necessary for effective protection against foreign inva-
26 ~~sion, sought the establishment of either a professional standing
army or a centrally controlled militia.2 7 The Anti-Federalists, con-
cerned with the threat of federal government oppression, strongly
opposed the Federalist plan, preferring instead the placement of
military power "in the hands of civil authorities and the people at
large."'28 This conflict was a continual source of tension between
24 See id. at 215; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 21-25 (commenting on well-regu-
lated militia); Wiener, supra note 20, at 182 (discussing historical background of colonial
militia). "[E]very adult male was required to keep and bear his own arms, for there were no
police protection and no standing army in peacetime." FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
A militiaman was a citizen soldier in the truest sense. Militia were not organized
and trained to fill in for a standing army, or to build sandbag dikes after a heavy
rain. They were designed as a collection of ordinary citizens of all callings, each
with a personal, deep stake in his family's community and in the polity of which
he was a member.
Newman, supra note 4, at 4.
25 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 20; Wiener, supra note 20, at 182 (deficien-
cies of militia were subject of "bitter complaint"). George Washington stated that "'[tlo
place any dependence on [the] Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff .... If I
was called upon to declare upon Oath . . .whether the Militia have been most serviceable
or hurtful upon the whole; I should subscribe to the latter.'" Id. at 183 (quoting Letter from
George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776), reprinted in 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 106, 110, 112 (1932)).
20 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 330-31 (Max Farrand ed.,
Rev. ed. 1966).
2'7 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 20. George Washington preferred a militia
consisting of a body of younger men from the community "who should be properly officered,
and periodically trained under uniform supervision." Wiener, supra note 20, at 183.
28 FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 46; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 21;
Kates, supra note 3, at 225. The Anti-Federalist's were concerned with giving control over
the militia to a central authority. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 21. "Having just
fought a war against a powerful ruler who used the military as his tool of enforcement, many
... were not anxious to give their militias to the new central government." Id.
The Anti-Federalists believed that the original Constitution, as written prior to the en-
actment of the Bill of Rights, was unclear as to whether the states had the power to arm and
train the militia if Congress failed to do so. Id. at 22. The fear of federal disarmament of the
states fueled demand for the enactment of the Second Amendment. Id. However, the Anti-
Federalists believed that the protection supplied by the Second Amendment would be insuf-
ficient if control of state militias was given to the federal government. Kates, supra note 3,
at 225 n.87. There was concern that the federal government might abuse its power over the
militia "either by making militia service intolerable or by failing to organize the militia at
all"-thus necessitating the formation of a standing army. Id. Such was the case in England
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the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists during the debates on rat-
ification of the Constitution.29
Notwithstanding their differences regarding the establishment
of a centralized military, references throughout the debates to self-
protection and expressions of concern regarding the federal gov-
ernment's power to outlaw weapons and to disarm the people sug-
gest that both sides believed in the individual right to keep and
bear arms.30 In fact, given that the establishment of a professional
police force was many years away when the Constitution was
adopted and that several states ratifying the Constitution made
recommendations similar to the New Hampshire proposal, which
"include[d] a bill of rights providing 'Congress shall never disarm
any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion,' ,3'
one can argue that the one thing Federalists and Anti-Federalists
agreed on was that citizens should be allowed to arm themselves.
However, historical evidence of the Framers' actual intent re-
garding the scope of the Second Amendment remains unclear. Per-
during the 1600s, when the kings, regarding the militia as an inadequate military force,
failed to muster or train them and instead formed a powerful centralized standing army. See
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 10-41.
"The events of the pre-Revolutionary decade, especially the Boston Massacre, served
only to harden the [Anti-Federalists'] conviction that 'military aid [was] ... dangerous to a
free civil state, and [was] ... used as an effectual engine to subvert it.'" Newman, supra
note 4, at 4 (quoting CLINTON RoSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIc 386-87 (1953)). Other
objections to a standing army included the enormous cost, which would result in higher
taxes, and the quartering of soldiers, who tended to be ruffians, in private homes. See Ehr-
man & Henigan, supra note 8, at 10-11.
The concern regarding the quartering of soldiers in private homes was directly ad-
dressed in the Third Amendment to the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. amend. III. The
amendment reads as follows: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law." Id.
29 See Wiener, supra note 20, at 184. "The Debates reflect, in part at least, widespread
and exaggerated fears of standing armies." Id.; see also supra note 17 (section of English
Bill of Rights addressing standing armies).
30 See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 5-2, at 299 n.6.; Dowlut, supra note 2, at 62; Kates, supra
note 3, at 221-22.
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves and
their own State, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no
law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals ....
Dowlut, supra note 2, at 62 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-
1788 422 (1888)). But see Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 20 (nowhere in constitutional
debates was there discussion of right to keep or bear arms.).
"' Kates, supra note 3, at 222; see also supra note 24 (referring to lack of police
protection).
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suasive authority exists to support conflicting theories for inter-
preting the amendment. Because of this uncertainty, the onus is on
the courts to provide a contemporary construction of the right to
keep and bear arms.
II. INTERPRETING THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
A. The Text: State's Right v. Individual Right
"No one has ever described the Constitution as a marvel of
clarity, and the Second Amendment is perhaps one of the worst
drafted of all of its provisions."32 However, the amendment is un-
like other amendments in the Bill of Rights in that it contains its
own preamble.3 3 The preamble-"A well regulated militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State . . ."34 -has been the focus
of the debate between those who believe that the Second Amend-
ment protects only the states' right to establish a military force
and those who view the amendment as protecting the individual's
right.35
Gun control advocates,38 as well as the majority of courts and
scholars, support the state's right view,3 7 asserting that the pream-
32 Levinson, supra note 3, at 643-44.
31 See id. at 644; Newman, supra note 4, at 4.
", U.S. CONST. amend. II. Other sections of the Constitution have similar preambles or
statements of purpose. Levinson, supra note 3, at 644 & n.38. The patent and copyright
clause in Article I, however, contains a preamble that sets out its purpose. Id. at 644 n.38;
see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....").
11 See Kates, supra note 3, at 206-07 & nn.10-14; Nelson Lund, The Second Amend-
ment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 105 (1987);
Newman, supra note 4, at 4; Udulutch, supra note 4, at 30-32.
" See Udulutch, supra note 4, at 19 n.2. The most recognized advocates of gun control
are represented by Handgun Control, Inc., the Foundation for Handgun Education, and the
National Coalition to Ban Handguns. Id. Additionally, of significant importance today is the
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, whose Legal Action Project in Washington, D.C. is at
the forefront of the battle in favor of gun control. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at
5 n.**, 57-58 (Mr. Henigan is Director of Legal Action Project).
11 See Kates, supra note 3, at 206; Lund, supra note 35, at 105; Udulutch, supra note 4,
at 31 & n.72; see also United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.) (clear that Second
Amendment guarantees collective right rather than individual right), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of
the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 623-24 (1986) (gun control propo-
nents seize phrase "well regulated militia" as sole purpose of constitutional guarantee); Roy
G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: A Historical Analysis of the Second
Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 962 (1975) (same); Death Penalty? Society Has
Ruled, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1988, at 12 (not easy to understand why Second Amendment
should be viewed as creating right to own and carry weapon that contributes so directly to
shocking number of murders) (excerpts from speech on capital punishment by retired Su-
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ble is dispositive and limits the right to bear arms to the context of
a state organized militia.38 In contrast, opponents of gun control
argue that because the amendment addresses "the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear arms," it creates an unequivocal right to be
asserted by individuals.3 They contend that the Framers would
not have employed the words of an individual guarantee if they
were concerned only with the necessity of a militia.40
preme Court Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., delivered on Aug. 7, 1988 in Toronto during A.B.A.
annual meeting). But see LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITU-
TION 341 (1988) (Framers probably intended individual right on Second Amendment); cf.
Kates, supra note 3, at 206-07 & n.11 (individual right theory favored by majority of general
public).
38 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 42-50; Kates, supra note 3, at 207, 214;
Lund, supra note 35, at 105; Newman, supra note 4, at 4; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 3,
at 67-68, 78 (state's right view justifies gun control as constitutional). Professor Tribe, in his
footnote on the Second Amendment, see supra note 3, indicated that the preamble does in
fact explain the purpose of the Amendment and that "'the framers and ratifiers [of the
Constitution] opted against leaving to the future the attribution of [other] purposes . ..
choosing instead to explicitly legislate the goal of the Amendment in terms of which the
provision was to be interpreted.'" TRIE, supra note 3, § 5-2, at 299 n.6 (quoting JOHN H.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1989)).
31 See Kates, supra note 3, at 218 (state's right view not in accord with constitutional
construction); Lund, supra note 35, at 107 (Second Amendment mentions "'right of the
people' to keep and bear arms" rather than right of states to regulate militia); see also
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 35-36 (listing numerous articles advocating individual right ap-
proach); Hardy, supra note 2, at 1 n.3 (support of individual right view exploded from 1982
to 1987). See generally Dowlut, supra note 2, at 60-71 (historical background and constitu-
tional interpretation supports individual guarantee to arms).
In 1975, a national poll revealed that 70% of the general public believed that the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees an individual's right to bear arms, while an additional 3%
thought it gave both an individual right to bear arms and a state right to establish an official
armed militia. See Kates, supra note 3, at 207 n.11; Lund, supra note 35, at 105 n.3. Curi-
ously enough, polls also indicate wide public support for some form of gun control. See
Kates, supra note 3, at 207 n..
40 See Dowlut, supra note 2, at 64-68; Kates, supra note 3, at 214-20; Levinson, supra
note 3, at 645-50; see also Lund, supra note 35, at 107 (equating "right of the people" with
"right of the states" violates Constitution's obvious meaning); cf. Wendy Brown, Guns Cow-
boys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's the Embar-
rassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 661 (1989) (Second Amendment may be "to-
ken and vehicle of collective civic resistance against the domestic imperialism of centralized
state power"). But see Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 32-34 (Framers never intended
to provide for individual right).
Individual right proponents observe that the Framers of the Constitution defined the
term "militia" as "every able-bodied man." See ALAN M. GOTTLIEB, THE RIGHTS OF GUN
OwNERs 7 (1981). Indeed, in the twentieth century, "militia" has been defined in title 10 as
"the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members
of the National Guard or the Naval Militia." 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, according to the individual right view, "well regulated" does not mean "gov-
ernment controlled"; at the time of the Second Amendment's ratification, the term meant
"properly disciplined." See Hardy, supra note 37, at 626 n.328.
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As with many other constitutional dilemmas, the issue is not
disposed of easily." Proponents of the state's right and individual
right theories firmly support their extreme views, ignoring the pos-
sibility that the amendment was intended to recognize both "the
importance of the militia to a free state" and the "individual right
to own and carry arms."'" Thus, it is up to the courts to reconcile
the meaning of the amendment's text43 and to uncover its true
significance. 4
B. Incorporation Against the States
Advocates of the individual right view, believing that their ab-
solutist interpretation of the Second Amendment is applicable
against the state's via the Fourteenth Amendment, contend that
the states, like the federal government, are precluded from regulat-
ing against individual gun ownership. 45 To support their view, they
Another source of support for the individual right interpretation is James Madison's
original design for the Bill of Rights. See Lund, supra note 35, at 107 n.9. Madison planned
to insert the Bill of Rights into the text of the original document. Id. Specifically, the right
to keep and bear arms was to be inserted not into article I, § 8 or article I, § 10, where the
military and militia clauses are situated, but into article I, § 9, along with the First Amend-
ment. Id. Article I, § 9 is the "principle 'individual rights' section of the original Constitu-
tion." Id. But cf. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 32 (Madison's original draft of Sec-
ond Amendment focused on military).
"' See EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 158 (1985) ("right to
keep and bear arms is nothing less than a continuing American dilemma").
42 Hardy, supra note 2, at 2-3, 59. "[N]either the collective [right] nor individual school
of thought is correct insofar as it claims to entirely explain the [S]econd [A]mendment, and
both are correct, insofar as they purport to offer partial explanations." Id. at 3; see also
Newman, supra note 4, at 4.
13 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 59-62; see also supra notes 12-31 (discussing historical
background of Second Amendment).
" See Newman, supra note 4, at 5. As part of the celebration of 200th anniversary of
the Bill of Rights, Charles W. Newman stated that
[t]he Second Amendment should be a constant reminder to both the citizenry and
the government of one of the basic precepts of democracy: that the government
serves by the authority of the people, and at the pleasure of the people. That we
have the right to keep and bear arms cautions us to protect our civil liberties
jealously. Each of us is the ultimate guarantor of his or her own freedoms, and the
freedoms of another. It is a responsibility not to be taken lightly, and one to be
fully considered ....
Id.
" See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 107-53; RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEP-
TICS SPEAK OUT 180-81 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter RESTRICTING HANDGUNS];
Kates, supra note 3, at 253-58; Levinson, supra note 3, at 652-54; Lund, supra note 35, at
112-13. Individual right advocates believe that the right to keep and bear arms applies to
the states because it meets the criteria set by the Supreme Court in determining whether a
"provision of the Bill of Rights is so fundamental as to justify [its] incorporation": (1) it is
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refer to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, both enacted in response to the
"Black Codes," which were adopted in many southern states to
prevent freed slaves from sharing the rights enjoyed by other citi-
zens, including the right to possess arms.46 Citing congressional in-
tent to guarantee for all citizens the rights enumerated in the Bill
of Rights, individual right advocates cannot see "how the Second
Amendment could not be considered incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth. '47
State's right advocates, of course, oppose the incorporation
481view, maintaining that even if the Second Amendment guaran-
tees an individual right to keep and bear arms-which they do not
believe it does-the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruik-
shank,4" Presser v. Illinois,5" and Miller v. Texas5l had already es-
tablished that the amendment's restrictions apply only against the
federal government.2 However, their reasoning cannot withstand
deeply rooted in our heritage; and (2) the Framers held the right in high regard. See Kates,
supra note 3, at 254 & n.215.
41 See HALBROOK, supra note 2, at 111-17; HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 107-15; RE-
STRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 45, at 180-81; Kates, supra note 3, at 254-57; Levinson,
supra note 3, at 651; Lund, supra note 35, at 113 n.25.
In 1857, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford held that a freed slave could not
possess arms. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney
reasoned that the right to bear arms, like the right to travel from one state to another, was
an unequivocal attribute of citizenship. See id. at 416-17. Chief Justice Taney stated that
because the Framers clearly did not consider a black person as having the right to bear
arms, a Black could never be considered a citizen for that particular constitutional purpose.
Id. at 417.
The Special Report of the Anti-Slavery Conference of 1867 noted that by prohibiting
them from owning or bearing arms, the Black Codes rendered Blacks defenseless against
attacks by their former masters or other Whites. See RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 45,
at 181; Kates, supra note 3, at 256. Responding to cases like Scott and the South's attempt
to curtail the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
two years later the Fourteenth Amendment, in an effort to prevent states from infringing on
the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 153; RE-
STRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 45, at 181; Kates, supra note 3, at 255-56.
41 RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 45, at 181.
48 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 52-57; Kates, supra note 3, at 257; Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition at 3-8, Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van
De Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 90-097), appeal docketed, No. 91-15466
(9th Cir. July 29, 1991) [hereinafter Memorandum of Amici Curiae].
49 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
5, 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
82 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 52-57. In Cruikshank, the Court stated that
the right to bear arms
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close scrutiny because it relies upon cases that were decided before
the concept of incorporation was adopted. Nonetheless, because
of the Supreme Court's rejection of "the proposition that the en-
tire Bill of Rights applies to the states, ' 54 a number of federal and
state courts refuse to incorporate the Second Amendment against
state governments.55
C. Judicial Interpretations
In its analysis of the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court
has consistently approved the interpretation offered by state's
right advocates." In United States v. Miller,57 for example, the
Court upheld the National Firearms Act of 1934, which outlawed
the possession of sawed-off shotguns transported in interstate com-
merce.5" Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds stated that the
Second Amendment must always be interpreted and applied in
light of its "obvious purpose[:] to assure the continuation and
ig not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it
shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall
not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other
effect than to restrict the powers of the National Government.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
53 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 56; Levinson, supra note 3, at 653; see also
Dowlut, supra note 2, at 71 (Presser and Cruikshank have "little precedential value");
Kates, supra note 3, at 252-53 & nn.211-12 (Presser and Miller cannot survive rigid consti-
tutional analysis). The first incorporation case was delivered three years after Miller, in
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), where the Supreme Court first
applied the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the states via the Fourteenth. Id. at 241.
" Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The Supreme Court has established that not every
right enumerated in the Bill of Rights applies to the states. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (incorporating only rights "fundamental to our free society"); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (incorporating only rights necessary to American
concept of ordered liberty); see also Memorandum of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6
(arguing that Supreme Court has made only certain rights applicable to states).
" See Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987); Krisko v. Oswald, 655 F.
Supp. 147, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Enablom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 398 n.1
(Minn. 1980).
"' See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 8, at 40-41; Brief Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States at 9-13, Farmer v. Hig-
gins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-600), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991) [herein-
after Farmer Brief]. But cf. Dowlut, supra note 2, at 71 (Supreme Court cases on Second
Amendment do not decide "full scope and meaning of right").
:7 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
1 Id. at 178.
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render possible the effectiveness of [state militias]." ' 9 Accordingly,
because a sawed-off shotgun has no "reasonable relationship to...
a well regulated militia," and because "its use could [not] contrib-
ute to the common defense," the Court concluded that the statute
was constitutional.60 Although the Court's language might be inter-
preted as extending Second Amendment protections to any
weapon with military utility,61 courts have dismissed such argu-
ments as inconsistent with the context of the opinion.2
More recently, in Lewis v. United States,3 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its state's right approach, which has been consistently
followed by both federal and state courts.6 4 Reiterating its holding
in Miller, the Court stated that "legislative restrictions on the use
of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria,
nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties."6 5
9 Id. But see Dowlut, supra note 2, at 73-74 (Court's decision in Miller was one-sided);
Lund, supra note 35, at 109-10 (Miller leads to ridiculous results).
60 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
6 See Dowlut, supra note 2, at 74-75; Levinson, supra note 3, at 654. Weapons with
military utility include many of the ones categorized as "assault weapons." See infra notes
75-139 and accompanying text (discussing assault weapons and related legislation).
62 See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (pro-
position that guarantee of right to keep and bear arms is not subject to state restriction is
"based on dicta quoted out of context"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
63 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
64 Id. at 65 n.8; see also United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on
other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (1st Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058
(D.C.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 868 (1987); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 398 n.1 (Minn.
1980).
Although the judiciary continues to view the Second Amendment as protecting a state's
right to a well regulated militia, some courts in states with "right to bear arms" provisions
in their constitutions, see supra note 2, have found an individual right to arms for self-
defense on state constitutional grounds. See Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470
N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ill. 1984); Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990); People
v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (Mich. 1931). Nevertheless, some of the same state courts have
acknowledged that such an individual right is not absolute, but subject to state regulation.
See Kellogg, 562 NE.2d at 694.
6" Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8. The most recent case to almost reach the Supreme Court
on the issue of gun control is Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991). The Court in Farmer denied certiorari to a case involving a
challenge to a federal statute prohibiting the private ownership of machine guns not law-
fully possessed prior to May 19, 1986. See id. (challenge to 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp.
1991)).
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D. Constitutional Interpretation or Political Ideology?
Commentators on the Second Amendment have noted the
irony that both individual right and state's right advocates offer
interpretations of the Second Amendment that directly conflict
with their general understanding of the remainder of the Constitu-
tion.6 6 The stereotypical "conservative," who traditionally inter-
prets the Bill of Rights narrowly, often reads the Second Amend-
ment broadly in favor of the individual right approach, while the
person customarily labelled a "liberal" because of his or her expan-
sive reading of the Constitution, generally favors the restrictive
state's right interpretation. 7 It is suggested that supporters of
both views are influenced more by their respective causes than by
their convictions regarding the Framers' intent. This explains why
state's right advocates assert that the phrase "right of the people"
pertains to individuals in the First and Fourth Amendments, but
pertains solely to the states in the Second Amendment. 8 It also
clarifies why, given the historical reality of the militia being "com-
prised of every adult male," each possessing his own weapon,
state's right proponents do not at least recognize the individual
right as falling within the penumbra of rights that emanate from
the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to "give them life and
substance."6 Finally, it would provide an explanation for the in-
" See Kates, supra note 3, at 206-11; Levinson, supra note 3, at 641; Newman, supra
note 4, at 4. See generally ELY, supra note 38 (discussing constitutional interpretation).
67 See Kates, supra note 3, at 207-10; Levinson, supra note 3, at 652 n.73 ("conserva-
tives," who have restrictive view of Bill of Rights incorporation doctrine, strongly advocate
incorporation of Second Amendment against states); see also supra notes 45-55 and accom-
panying text (discussing incorporation doctrine and Second Amendment).
Many "intellectuals," favoring the state's right theory, speak out in opposition to the
individual right to bear arms. See Lund, supra note 35, at 105. Ironically, some of the most
vocal supporters of gun control, in direct conflict with their anti-gun beliefs, have used their
political influence to obtain a permit to possess or carry a firearm. See Kates, supra note 3,
at 208-09 & n.17. "Although such permits are officially available only on a showing of
'unique need' to carry a defensive weapon," the list of permit holders includes such zealous
advocates of gun control as Nelson Rockefeller, former New York City Mayor John Lindsay,
and former New York Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger. Id.
6$ See Kates, supra note 3, at 218; Lund, supra note 35, at 107; see also Levinson,
supra note 3, at 645 (term "people" is used similarly in First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments). But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (interpreting
Free Exercise Clause portion of First Amendment narrowly); cf. Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 8, at 47-48 (Second Amendment is distinguishable from other parts of Bill of Rights
because it protects public interest, not private interest).
'9 See Walker, supra note 3, at 1412; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965). "[Slpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id.
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consistencies between the individual right position and the limited
gun control provisions endorsed by organizations like the NRA. 70
In a study of the right to keep and bear arms, there is no
"need to join up sides and engage in [a] vigorous political strug-
gle." 17  Gun control is not an issue to be debated only by "gun
nuts" and "bleeding-heart liberals. '7 2 It affects all of us and de-
mands thoughtful treatment and debate.73 We must remember
that the Second Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, is an
essential component of our legal system: if we claim that "'the
Second Amendment is not worth the paper it is written on, [then]
what price the First?' "74
III. BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS
A. Legislative Attempts
The alarming homicide rate in the United States has often
been directly attributed to the proliferation of handguns.7 5 Re-
cently, however, disturbing events have shifted the focus of atten-
tion from handguns to assault weapons.76 In January 1989, a gun-
man armed with an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle killed five children
while spraying over one hundred rounds of ammunition across a
70 See Kates, supra note 3, at 209-10. "By concentrating attention on the state's right
position, the gun-ovmer organizations have been able to avoid the details of their own indi-
vidual right position, which seems inconsistent with the kinds of gun controls the organiza-
tions have themselves endorsed." Id. at 209.
7' Levinson, supra note 3, at 659.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 658-59; Newman, supra note 4, at 4-5; cf. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 46-47
("[A] constitution is not to receive a technical or strained construction.") (quoting Common-
wealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1976)).
7' Levinson, supra note 3, at 658 (quoting Fred Donaldson, Letter to the Editor, Aus-
TIN AMERICA-STATESMAN, July 8, 1989, at A19) (criticizing supporters of 1989 Supreme Court
decision deeming flag-burning protected under First Amendment).
718 See CRIME REPORTS, supra note 5, at 12. In the last few years, firearms were used "in
approximately three of every five murders committed in the United States." Id.
In 1990 alone, approximately 50% of all reported murders were committed with hand-
guns, 6% with shotguns, 4% with rifles, and 4% with other or unknown types of firearms.
Id.
The numbers are much higher in large urban cities. In New York City, for instance,
handguns caused 68% of all homicides during 1989 and accounted for the deaths of 1,476
persons in 1990. See NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, ILLEGAL FIREARMS: LEGISLATION, QUES-
TIONS AND ANSWERS 16 (1991). The ease with which criminals are able to obtain guns is
illustrated by the New York City Police Department's confiscation of 33,789 firearms in
1989 and 1990. Id. at 8.
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text; infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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Stockton, California schoolyard.77 More recently, on October 16,
1991, a gunman killed twenty-two people in a cafeteria in Belton,
Texas.78 Such devastating events, although not always involving
assault weapons, have moved gun control advocates to propose a
complete ban on assault weapons; they assert that these weapons
are designed solely to kill human beings, and serve no legitimate
sporting or recreational purpose. 9
Prior to January 1989, only the federal government and one
state, West Virginia, had enacted some form of assault weapon reg-
ulation.8 0 However, the federal legislation was limited to fully auto-
matic weapons," and the West Virginia statute was of limited util-
ity, since it did not even define the term "assault weapon. '8 2 In
1989, reacting to the Stockton tragedy, federal, state, and local leg-
islatures began efforts to implement a more comprehensive ban on
this type of firearm.' In that year alone, twenty-seven cities and
counties enacted ordinances to ban assault weapons. 4 However,
many attempts to ban assault weapons, including all proposed fed-
eral legislation, have been defeated as a result of the powerful
" See Thomas R. Thompson, Comment, Form or Substance? Definitional Aspects of
Assault Weapon Legislation, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 649, 649 (1990); Robert Reinhold, After
Shooting, Horror but Few Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1989, at B6.
78 See Thomas C. Hayes, Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas Cafeteria, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at Al. Although the Texas gunman used a .9mm handgun rather than
an assault weapon, gun control advocates cited this tragedy to bolster their national cam-
paign to ban assault weapons, which suffered a major defeat just one day later, when the
House of Representatives struck down a bill to ban the sale and ownership of assault weap-
ons. See H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Clifford Krauss, House Resoundingly
Defeats Ban on Semiautomatic Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at Al, A14.
" See Thompson, supra note 77, at 652 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West
1990)); Dinkins, supra note 8, at 1-2.
So See Thompson, supra note 77, at 650-51. See generally DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY-BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDI-
NANcES-FIREARMS (18th ed., 1988) (compiled list of state and local firearm regulations).
"' See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1991). Section 922(o) prohibits the private
possession of machine guns not lawfully possessed before May 19, 1986. Id. A machine gun,
for the purposes of § 922, is a firearm which shoots automatically more than one shot by a
single pull of the trigger. See id. § 921(a)(23) (referring to definition in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)
(1988)). Thus, assault weapons such as semi-automatic shotguns and rifles are not included
within this definition. See, e.g., New York, N.Y., [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 6 (No. 78)
(amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-301 (Williams 1986 & Supp. 1990) (defining
"assault weapon")).
82 Thompson, supra note 77, at 651; see W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1988).
83 See Thompson, supra note 77, at 649.
81 See CENTER TO PREVENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE, CITY AND COUNTY ORDINANCES ENACTED
IN 1989 (1990) (available from Center to Prevent Handgun Violence in Washington, D.C.).
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NRA lobby.8 5
B. Court Challenges
While NRA resources present an imposing obstacle to an as-
sault weapons ban, it appears that if Congress does enact such leg-
islation, NRA efforts to challenge the law in court will be futile.86
Numerous pro-gun groups have challenged state and local legisla-
tures' efforts to ban assault weapons, but courts generally have
been unreceptive to their arguments.8 7
1. Second Amendment
Notwithstanding the courts' historical rejection of the individ-
ual right interpretation of the Second Amendment, 8 pro-gun
groups continue to challenge assault weapon legislation on this ba-
sis. In Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp,9 the California
assault weapon law, the first state-wide restriction in the country,
was attacked on Second Amendment grounds."0 After tracing the
history of the amendment, the district court held, not surprisingly,
that "the Second Amendment stays the hand of the National Gov-
ernment only ... [and] that the Constitution has left the question
of gun control to the several states."'" Given the Supreme Court's
recognition of the states' authority to enact specific gun control
85 See Walt, supra note 4, at 13; see also Krauss, supra note 78, at Al, A14 (H.R. 3371
defeated). But see [1991] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 78) (amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE §§ 10-131, -301 to -310 (Williams 1986 & Supp. 1990)). See generally supra note 4
(describing NRA's objectives and purposes).
" See, e.g., Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(o)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991); cf. supra notes 56-65 and accompanying
text (courts do not recognize individual right to bear arms).
17 See infra notes 88-123 and accompanying text.
8" See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
Second Amendment).
8D 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-15466 (9th Cir. July 29,
1991).
11 Id. at 1417; see Jay Matthews, NRA Loses Court Challenge to California Assault-
Gun Ban, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 1990, at A5. Assault weapon legislation has also
been challenged as violating the "right to keep and bear arms" provisions in state constitu-
tions. See, e.g., Hale v. City of Columbus, 578 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (up-
holding local ordinance as substantially related to police power under Ohio State Constitu-
tion), appeal denied, 569 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio 1992); cf. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695
F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir. 1982) (individual right is subject to state's police power), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. App. 1989) (weapons
of mass destruction may be regulated notwithstanding state constitutional guarantee).
" Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1419.
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laws and its endorsement of the state's right approach to the Sec-
ond Amendment, any opposition to assault weapon legislation on
Second Amendment grounds appears doomed to the same result as
reached in Fresno.2
2. Right to Privacy
Another argument advanced by pro-gun groups is that assault
weapon legislation violates a person's constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 3 However, this argument extends this nebulous right far be-
yond the areas that have been traditionally considered constitu-
tionally protected.94
To prevail on a right to privacy argument, those challenging
an assault weapon ban would have to demonstrate that the right to
possess an assault weapon is fundamental or implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.9 5 Although the right of privacy "has been
applied in a myriad of areas, such as the right of a person not to
have his name or likeness used without his consent, the right to be
left alone, freedom of choice in marriage and family life, and so
forth,"9 " the application of this concept to the possession of fire-
arms seems tenuous at best. 7 While there is support for the con-
tention that an individual has a personal if not inalienable right to
self-defense,9 8 the Supreme Court has asserted, in dicta, that fire-
arms possession should not be accorded right to privacy
92 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (courts find no individual right to pos-
sess arms in Second Amendment).
93 See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1419; Kates, supra note 3, at 205 & n.6.
" Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973) (only certain personal rights are im-
plicit in Constitution). Some areas have traditionally been deemed protected by the right to
privacy. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-53 (1972) (contraception); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procrea-
tion); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same); see also Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1419-
20 (privacy right has never been applied to private citizen's right to own weapons).
95 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
" Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1420; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) (certain constitutional guarantees create penumbral rights of privacy); supra note 94
(cases recognizing privacy right).
11 See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1419-22. The Fresno court observed that there were no
holdings "equat[ing] the right to privacy with the right of self-defense, or the right to pos-
sess firearms." Id. at 1422.
11 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing inalienable right to self-
defense).
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protection.9
3. Bills of Attainder
Some pro-gun advocates have challenged assault weapon legis-
lation on the ground that such laws violate the constitutional pro-
hibition against Bills of Attainder,100 which are defined as "legisla-
tive acts . .. that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict pun-
ishment on them without a judicial trial."101 Because many assault
weapon laws contain lists of specifically prohibited weapons identi-
fied by model and by the manufacturer's name, °2 they do apply to
"easily ascertainable members of a group."' 03 However, the punish-
ment for past conduct that characterizes Bills of Attainder differs
from the penalties prescribed in assault weapon statutes because,
among other things, assault weapon statutes penalize future rather
than past misconduct. 04 Furthermore, while Bills of Attainder are
99 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
568 n.11 (1969). In Stanley, the Supreme Court stated the following:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal
Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or sto-
len goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia stat-
ute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id.; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 ("Stanley itself recognized that its holding offered no
protection for the possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods.").
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder."); see
also Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1422 (plaintiff argued that California Assault Weapon Control
Act was Bill of Attainder); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir.) (firearm regula-
tion challenged as Bill of Attainder), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972).
10, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (emphasis added) (discussing
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867)); see also Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977) (citing Cummings and Lovett); United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448 (1965) (quoting Lovett).
102 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12,275-12,290 (West Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:39(w) (West Supp. 1991); [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 6 (No. 78) (amending NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-301 (Williams 1986 & Supp. 1990)). The New York City statute,
instead of listing specific weapons in the law itself, makes provisions for the New York City
Police Commissioner to "designate specific semiautomatic centerfire or rimfire rifles or semi-
automatic shotguns ... as within the definition of assault weapon, if the commissioner de-
termines that such weapons are particularly suitable for military and not sporting pur-
poses." Id.
103 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 461. A Bill of Attainder may deprive an individual or a
group of people "by description rather than [by] name." Id. Therefore, whether there is a
named individual or a group, the "distinction[] [is] without a difference." Id.
104 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 458 (Bill of Attainder not found where intention was to
"forestall future dangerous acts") (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
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marked by punishment without trial, a person violating an assault
weapon law is "entitled to all of the rights available to criminal
defendants," including the right to a judicial trial.1°5
4. Takings Clause
Accompanying gun owners' concerns regarding a potential ban
on the sale of assault weapons is the fear that the next step will
include confiscating assault weapons from current owners.' In
some jurisdictions, these fears have been realized in the form of
legislation requiring owners of assault weapons to either surrender
the firearm to the police or remove it from the jurisdiction. 0 7
Gun owners have challenged these statutes as violations of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause'0 8 on the ground that, assuming
these laws benefit the public as a whole, individual gun owners
should be compensated when their weapons are destroyed or re-
duced in value for the public good. 09 Courts hearing these claims
have considered "such factors as physical appropriation and dimi-
nution in value, together with validity of governmental authority,
as revealed in the exercise of police power and eminent domain.'' °
Much to the frustration of gun owners, the Supreme Court has
determined that a state has no duty to compensate a property
owner if an entire class of property is destroyed for the public good
U.S. 382, 414 (1950)). Some assault weapon statutes allow current owners to keep their
weapons after a registration process, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12285, while others estab-
lish time frames in which to allow owners to remove the weapons from the jurisdiction, see,
e.g., [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 10 (No. 78) (amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-
303.1(d) (Williams 1986)) (allowing gun owners 90 days to dispose of their assault weapons).
The Supreme Court has established three tests for determining whether the punish-
ment prescribed by a statute is like the punishment that characterizes Bills of Attainder.
See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-78. Courts considering this question must examine: (1) whether
the statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether it does
nothing to further a non-punitive legislative purpose; and (3) whether it indicates a legisla-
tive intent to punish. Id. The penalty contemplated for violations of assault weapon legisla-
tion does not violate these tests. See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1423.
"0I See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1423.
106 See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
107 See, e.g., [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 10 (No. 78) (amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 10-303.1(d)(1) (Williams 1986)) (within ninety days after effective date, assault
weapon owners may surrender weapon to police or remove it from jurisdiction).
1o' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
109 FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 9; cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897) (due process clause requires state to compensate owner when taking property for
public use).
110 FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 10.
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rather than taken for public use." ' The state and lower federal
courts, recognizing that many lawmakers consider assault weapons
a threat to public safety,11 2 have applied this concept to uphold the
destruction of weapons without compensation to the owners for
their loss."1 3
5. Civilian Marksmanship Program
Another argument offered by opponents of gun control is that
states are precluded from banning assault weapons because the
Federal Civilian Marksmanship Program preempts this area of gun
regulation." 4 Although the purpose of this program is to
"[p]romote [r]ifle [p]ractice" in the United States, 15 this argument
1" See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (government does not exceed its
constitutional powers upon destruction of one class of property to promote greater public
value); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (exercise of police power differs from
taking because it allows destruction of property for public good). In Mugler, the Court
found the government's destruction of alcohol during the prohibition era to be constitu-
tional. Id. Accordingly, a similar argument could be made regarding the destruction of sur-
rendered or confiscated assault weapons. See id.
112 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12,275.5 ("The Legislature finds and declares that the
proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of
all citizens of [California]."); [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 1 (No. 78) ("The [New York City]
council ... finds and declares that because assault weapons ... pose a grave threat to law
enforcement officers and to the public, it is necessary to impose restrictions on the posses-
sion, sale and use of such weapons .... ).
113 See Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 865 (D.C. 1979); see also Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1183-84 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (no taking found when "gun
owners who wish to may sell or otherwise dispose of their handguns outside of" jurisdiction),
aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). But cf. Udulutch,
supra note 4, at 41 (only controls falling short of complete ban on firearms would not re-
quire governmental compensation).
The New York City assault weapon law requires that any person legally in possession of
assault weapons prior to the effective date of the law "peaceably surrender his or her assault
weapon ... for the purpose of destruction of such weapon by the [police] commissioner,
provided that [the commissioner] may authorize the use of such weapon by the [police]
department." [1991] N.Y. Local Laws § 10 (No. 78) (amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE § 10-303.1(d)(1) (Williams 1986)). It seems that this provision, allowing the use of
surrendered assault weapons by the New York City Police Department, would require com-
pensation to their owners since now the property is not being destroyed, but taken for pub-
lic use. See supra notes 111 and accompanying text (compensation required for taking but
not for destruction under police power); see also Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 241
(taking for public use requires compensation). But cf. George James, Trying to Rid the
Streets of Guns, by Buying Them, N.Y. TMIs, Nov. 20, 1991, at B1 (District Attorney's
office and Police Department initiated two week program to buy illegal guns from public).
114 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 4307-4313 (1988); Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1425 (plaintiff argued
that 10 U.S.C. §§ 4307-4313 preempted California assault weapon law).
110 10 U.S.C. § 4308(a)(3) (1988). The Civilian Marksmanship Program is administered
by the President and headed by a commissioned officer of the Army or the Marine Corps.
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has failed because the weapons banned by assault weapon statutes
are not the same as those employed in national rifle competi-
tions." 6 Additionally, some courts have recognized that "Congress
clearly expressed its intent not to occupy the field of intrastate gun
control."" 7
6. Vagueness
Assault weapon legislation may also be challenged as unconsti-
tutionally vague."' Legislatures attempting to define "assault
weapons" encounter difficulties in distinguishing between military
and sporting purposes" 9 and in keeping pace with changing tech-
nology and manufacturers' designs. 2 ° Thus, the language of assault
Id. § 4307.
110 See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1426-27. "This is not to say that the federal program
outlined . . . in 10 U.S.C., section 4307 et seq. does not encourage local clubs to become
proficient in assault weapons." Id. at 1427. However, if such encouragement is the intention
of the program "it is significant.., that no federal official or agency was a member of the
plaintiffs' group[]" challenging the ban in Fresno. Id.
The New York City assault weapon statute does not exempt sportsmen who use these
weapons in shooting competitions. See [19911 N.Y. Local Laws § 12 (No. 78) (amending
NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 10-305 (Williams 1986)). Thus, gun clubs fear that the law
will inhibit their ability to attract competitors. See Eileen A.J. Connelly, Island Gun Own-
ers Balk at Ban, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Oct. 28, 1991, at A13 (local gun club feared that it
could not hold competitions for Empire State Games or U.S. Olympic team).
11' Coalition of N.J. Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D.N.J. 1990); see also
Krashesky v. Codd, 391 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793-94 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) (Congress did not
intend to preempt firearms field). Parties arguing that Congress did not intend to occupy
the field of firearms regulation rely on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1988). The text of
§ 927 reads as follows:
No provision of the chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates ta the exclusion
of the law of any state on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two
cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.
Id.; see also C.D.M. Prods., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.Y.S.2d 500, 507-08 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1973) (New York City Police Commissioner authorized to regulate firearms
since federal government has not preempted field).
118 Cf. United States v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible
Starter Guns, 443 F.2d 463, 464-66 (2d Cir.) ("readily convertible" language in weapons
statute challenged as vague), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d
861, 865 (D.C. 1979) (firearms statute challenged as overbroad and vague).
"I See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE ATF WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPORTABILITY OF CERTAIN SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES 6
(1989). "[Tihe modern military assault rifle contains a variety of physical features and char-
acteristics designed for military applications which distinguishes it from traditional sporting
rifles." Id.
120 Se Thompson, supra note 77, at 670.
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weapon statutes may arguably fail to provide adequate warning of
the types of firearms outlawed. 121 Nevertheless, vagueness chal-
lenges to firearms legislation have been consistently rejected by the
courts.
122
Notwithstanding the numerous challenges to the validity of re-
strictions on gun ownership, courts continue to uphold assault
weapon legislation. 123  Questions remain, however, regarding
whether these laws are effective in preventing violent crime.
C. A Necessary Solution or Political Demagoguery?
"[N]o civil society could long exist in which individuals had an
absolute right to own whatever armaments they chose.' 1 24 No one
would suggest that there is a constitutional right to possess nuclear
weapons for self-defense; 125 it is obvious that the public is safer if
certain types of weapons remain available solely to the military.
26
Many argue that assault guns fall within the class of weapons
to which only the military should have access. 27 Indeed, if assault
weapons serve no purpose apart from the taking of human life, and
if they are disproportionately utilized in the commission of
121 See 16,179 Molso Italian, 443 F.2d at 466. "[A] statute is... vague [when] ... 'men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). "[L]anguage
[of the statute must] convey[] 'sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices."' Id. at 465-66 (quoting United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)).
It appears that certain provisions under the New York City assault weapon law would
not give fair or adequate notice of proscribed conduct. See [1991] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 78).
For instance, the statute excludes "any rifle or shotgun modified to render it permanently
inoperative." Id. § 6 (amending NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-301.16(d) (Williams
1986 & Supp. 1990)). Yet the law does not define this term. See id. But cf. People v. Sim-
mons, 479 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1984) ("If a weapon is
mechanically defective or incapable of being fired without repair or reconstruction, it is in-
operable and as a matter of law not a weapon within the meaning of the [N.Y.] Penal
Law."). Thus, a firearm collector who thinks that by common-sense standards his weapon is
permanently inoperative, may in fact be in violation of the statute.
See 16,179 Molso Italian, 443 F.2d at 465-66; Fesian, 399 A.2d at 865.
12s See Fresno, 746 F. Supp. at 1415; Coalition of N.J. Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F.
Supp. 602, 610 (D.N.J. 1990); Hale v. City of Columbus, 578 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990), appeal denied, 569 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio 1992).
24 Farmer Brief, supra note 56, at 17.
125 See Lund, supra note 35, at 121.
2I See id. "[T]he Framers probably did not mean to include heavy ordinance within
the scope of the Second Amendment." Id. at 121 n.44.
1'7 See Dinkins, supra note 8, at 1-2; supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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crimes,'28 then at a minimum they should be heavily regulated. 129
However, for reasonable gun control regulations to be effective,
they must be enacted at the federal level rather than on a piece-
meal basis by the several states. 30 Only then may limitations on
the manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weapons have a
significant practical effect.' 3 '
A number of politicians, apparently believing that regulation
is insufficient, advocate the banning of assault weapons.3 2 The as-
sault weapon has become a popular target because it provides an
easy explanation for the rapid increase in the levels of homicide
and other violent crimes. 133 Ironically, if the government enacts
legislation banning assault weapons, law-abiding citizens are the
only persons who will be deprived of their use.13 4 The reality is
that gun control will not deter criminals from possessing or using
assault weapons; 35 if drug dealers can penetrate U.S. borders and
128 See Judith Bonderman & Dennis A. Henigan, Paying the Bill for Violence, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 13 (assault weapons are 20 times more likely to be used during com-
mission of crime than handguns, and 25 times more likely during drug offense). But see
Johnson, supra note 8, at F2 (more police officers killed with knives and by criminals using
motor vehicles than by assault weapons).
13' Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (although fundamental
right, government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech).
"0' See Udulutch, supra note 4, at 43. Federal gun control legislation is the only effec-
tive and practical way to eliminate the trafficking of firearms from state to state. Id.
131 See id. at 41-42.
132 See, e.g., Dinkins, supra note 8, at 1-2 (speech against assault weapons).
13 See id.; see also supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing upsurge of vio-
lent crime in America and gun control); cf. supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (Sec-
ond Amendment debate is motivated more by politics than by rational thought).
At least one commentator has criticized the all-out battle against assault weapons by
some politicians:
Semi-automatic firearm legislation is appealing to the uninformed because it
uses the misnomers assault weapon or assault rifle. Hence, the official military
definition is enlightening: "Assault rifles are short, compact, selective-fire weapons
that fire a cartridge intermediate in power between submachinegun and rifle car-
tridges. Assault rifles have mild recoil characteristics and, because of this, are ca-
pable of delivering effective full automatic fire at ranges up to 300 meters." The
political advantage of mislabeling a semiautomatic firearm as a fully automatic
firearm is obvious. However, a debate in which misinformation prevails can only
lead to bad policy.
Dowlut, supra note 2, at 81 (footnote omitted) (quoting DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE SMALL ARMS IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATION GUIDE-EURASIAN COM-
MUNIST COUNTRIES 105 (1976)).
' See Lund, supra note 35, at 127; cf. Dowlut, supra note 2, at 82. "Crime ... 'must
be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of a consti-
tutional privilege.'" Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560 (1878)).
13' See Lund, supra note 35, at 127; cf. Wayne King, New Jersey Law to Limit Guns is
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reap millions of dollars in illegal profits, it is conceded that they
will arm themselves accordingly.1 36
It is often argued that a ban on guns is worthwhile if it saves
one innocent life. However, this position ignores the reality that a
gun can also be used to save a crime victim or some other innocent
person from death at the hands of a brutal criminal.137 An absolute
ban on assault weapons-as opposed to their reasonable regula-
tion-is not a miracle cure for this country's crime problem. 3 8 Un-
til legislators confront the core troubles affecting our society, such
as drug abuse, unemployment, and the declining quality of public
education, any indication that an absolute ban on assault weapons
will provide even partial relief from the crisis may be fairly de-
scribed as no more than political demagoguery.1
39
Being Ignored, N.Y. Tums, Oct. 26, 1991, at 22 (few assault weapons collected since law's
enactment). A murderer does not stop killing because of a threat of an added criminal
charge. See Lund, supra note 35, at 127. "The only way to deter... people from using guns
for criminal purposes is by punishing them for the underlying crime and perhaps imposing
additional penalties for using firearms in the commission of a crime." Id. See generally Don
B. Kates, Jr., Eight Myths of Gun Control, NAT'L REV., Oct. 21, 1991, at 30 (debunking gun
control myths).
136 See Robert Friedman & Barry Meier, Far Beyond Law's Controls, NEWSDAY, July
31, 1988, at 5; Jim Stewart & Andrew Alexander, Colombian Drug Rings Armed With U.S.
Guns, Experts Say, reprinted in FIREPOWER, supra note 8, at 11.
13 See Dowlut, supra note 2, at 82 (legally possessed guns may deter crime). One court
admitted that although the defendant violated a harsh gun licensing law, possessing the gun
may have saved his life. See Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 489 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Mass. 1989);
see also Dowlut, supra note 2, at 82 ("An armed people . . . serve as deterrent against
crime.").
It is speculated that during the Texas incident in which a gunman killed 22 people, see
supra note 78 and accompanying text, if one victim had carried a firearm, he or she might
have saved his or her own life and the lives of many others. Cf. Dowlut, supra note 2, at 82
n.163 (illegal gun saved life). But cf. Debra Dobray & Arthur J. Waldrop, Regulqting Hand-
gun Advertising Directed at Women, 12 WHITTIER L. REv. 113, 115 n.16 (1991) (gun may
give "'false sense of security' ") (quoting Gwen Holden, Executive Vice President of Na-
tional Criminal Justice Association).
I's See Krauss, supra note 78, at A14 (behavior cannot be controlled) (quoting White
House spokeswoman Judy Smith); cf. King, supra note 135, at 22 ("[New Jersey assault
weapon] law is proving difficult if not impossible to enforce.").
139 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Dowlut, supra note 2, at 82 (gun
control has several political functions); Norman Siegel, Let's Debate Drug Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at A27 (gun control must be augmented by confronting the drug
problem).
The authors of this Note have attended funerals of New York City police officers killed
in the line of duty, and observed as politicians seized the opportunity to advocate gun con-
trol as a means of protecting police officers' lives. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, A Brooklyn Man
Seized in Slaying of Police Officer, N.Y. Tiars, July 19, 1980, § 2, at 22 (Mayor Koch
advocated gun control). However, while sophisticated weapons remain widely available to
criminals, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department refuses to arm his
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CONCLUSION
The necessity and propriety of some type of gun control, par-
ticularly as applied to assault weapons, must be acknowledged.
Unfortunately, it is the law-abiding citizen, rather than the crimi-
nal, who is affected most by gun control. Criminals will continue to
obtain firearms to further their illicit purposes. Thus, while the
regulation of gun ownership has merit, if done on the federal level,
severe penalties and restrictions should be geared towards those
who misuse firearms rather than those who simply possess them.
We can only hope that any legislation enacted will be prompted
not by political ulterior motives, but by a sincere commitment to
reducing violent crime through the improvement of the country's
criminal justice, educational, and social systems.
The Second Amendment is an essential part of the Bill of
Rights, and serves as a reminder that government acts at the will
of the people. Nevertheless, courts continue to view the amend-
ment as merely guaranteeing a state's right to maintain a well-reg-
ulated militia. Therefore, the extent of the right to keep and bear
arms currently remains, at best, uncertain.
Robert A. O'Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira
patrol force with .9mm pistols, see Lee P. Brown, The .38 Versus the .9mm, SPRING 3100,
Jan.-Feb., 1991, at inside cover, leaving them to fight well-armed criminals with outdated
revolvers similar "to those seen on reruns of 'Gunsmoke.'" Molly Gordy, Gun Duel: Pistol
vs. Revolver, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1990, at 3. The Chief of Police of the New York City Transit
Police Department, William J. Bratton, however, has ignored New York City politics and
has armed his officers with .9mm pistols. See Donatella Lorch, Transit Police Dept. Will
Let Its Officers Carry 9-mm. Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, § 1, at 1; James C. McKinley
Jr., Subway Police to Get New Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at Al.
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